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-1JURISDICTION OF THE COURT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
The action was filed by appellant in the District Court of
Weber County where both parties reside, and where a motor vehicle
accident occurred.

Because the parties were fellow employees at

the Defense Depot Ogden, and because the accident occurred on the
premises of their employer, entitling appellant to receive
Workman's Compensation, which she has received, the Trial Court
granted respondent's motion for summary judgment finding that the
exclusive remedy of the appellant against her fellow employee, in
applying the Federal Employee's Compensation Act, which is identical in purpose to the Utah Workman's Compensation Act, was receipt
of Workman's Compensation.

The appellant appealed the Trial

Court's decision to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, and
the Supreme Court of the State of Utah assigned the matter to the
Utah Court of Appeals.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The principal issue of review being sought by the appellant
is whether the exclusive remedy of Workman's Compensation is
applicable against fellow employees when one employee is injured
by another employee on the premises of the employer even though
they have not yet .punched a time clock, but are proceeding toward
their work station within the premises of their common employer.

-2STATUTES WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINITIVE
The Federal Workman's Compensation Statute and Tort Claim
Statute apply because the accident occurred on a federal installation where both the appellant and respondent were employed.

The

pertinent portion of the Federal Employee's Compensation Act is
found in 5 U.S.C. Section 8116, and in the Federal Tort Claims
Act, 28 U.S.C. Section 2679, whose applicable terms are as
follows:
"5 U.S.C. §8116
(c) The liability of the United States or an instrumentality thereof under this sub-chapter or any extension
thereof with respect to the injury or death of an
employee is exclusive and instead of all other liability
of the United States or the instrumentality to the
employee, his legal representative, spouse, defendants,
next of kin, and any other person otherwise entitled to
recover damages from the United States or the instrumentality because of the injury or death in a direct judicial proceeding, in a civil action, or in admirality,
or by an administrative or judicial proceeding under a
Workman's Compensation Statute or under a Federal Tort
Liability Statute. However, this sub-section does not
apply to a master or a member of a crew vessel.
28 U.S.C. §2679
(b) The remedy by suit against the United States as
provided by Section 1346(b) of this Title for damage to
property or for personal injury, including death, resulting from the operation by any employee of the government
of any motor vehicle while acting within the scope of
his office or employment, shall hereafter be exclusive of
any other civil action or proceeding by reason of the
same subject matter against the employee or his estate
whose act or omission gave rise to the claim.11
Because, as will be shown hereafter, the interpretation of
the two aforementioned Federal Statutes are in harmony with the
interpretation given by the Utah Courts to the exclusive remedy

-3statute under the Utah Workmanfs Compensation Law, that exclusive
remedy statute, namely, Title 35-1-60, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
is hereby set out as follows:
"The right to recover compensation pursuant to the provisions of this Title for injuries sustained by an
employee, whether resulting in death or not, shall be
the exclusive remedy against the employer and shall be
the exclusive remedy against any officer, agent, or
employee of the employer and the liabilities of the
employer imposed by this Act shall be in place of any
and all other civil liability whatsoever, at common law
or otherwise, to such employee or to his spouse, widow,
children, parents, dependents, next of kin, heirs,
personal representatives, guardian, or any other person
whomsoever, on account of any accident or injury or
death, in any way contracted, sustained, aggravated or
incurred by such employee in the course of or because of
or arising out of his employment, and no action at law
may be maintained against an employer or against any
officer, agent, or employee of the employer based upon
any accident, injury or death of an employee. Nothing
in this Section, however, shall prevent an employee or
his dependents from filing a claim with the Industrial
Commission of Utah for compensation in those cases
within the provisions of the Utah Occupational Disease
Disability Act, as amended.11
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The case was filed by appellant against the respondent, a
fellow employee, seeking, in addition to the Workman!s Compensation
benefits she had received and was receiving, additional and further
compensation for damages for which she had already been compensated
by Workman's Compensation.

Because of the undisputed facts:

that

appellant and respondent were fellow employees; that the accident
occurred on the premises of their employer while both were entering

-4their work place; and that the appellant had applied for and
received Workman's Compensation for those injuries, the respondent
moved for and was granted summary judgment by the Trial Court
because Workman's Compensation is the appellant's exclusive remedy,
and she cannot maintain, in addition thereto, a tort action against
her fellow employee who allegedly caused her injury for which she
had already received Workman's Compensation benefits.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTg
The findings of fact made by the Trial Court, a copy of
which are attached to the appellant's brief, are not in dispute,
and were stipulated to by the parties.

Synoptically, they are

that both the appellant and the respondent entered their employer's
premises through a security gate, traveled within the military
installation boundaries to the place where they both worked, and
as both were on their way to their immediate place of employment,
the respondent's motor vehicle struck the appellant who had just
exited her car and was walking toward her duty station.

While

neither party had officially "punched in," both were on the
secured premises of their employer, and were in the immediate
vicinity of their work station.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Inasmuch as the appellant and the respondent, fellow employees, were involved in an accident on their employer's premises, on
which they were traveling incident to their employment, the

-5appellant was entitled to, applied for, and received Workman's
Compensation benefits in accordance with federal law.

The

applicable Federal Workman's Compensation Law, which is consonant
with Utah's Workman's Compensation Law mandates the exclusivity of
the Workman's Compensation as the appellant's sole remedy, and
precludes an action in tort against the fellow employee who may
have caused the injury by some act of negligence.

The Trial

Court's summary judgment should, therefore, be sustained.
ARGUMENTS
I
UNDER EITHER THE FEDERAL EMPLOYEE'S COMPENSATION ACT OR THE
UTAH WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION ACT, FELLOW EMPLOYEES ARE
IMMUNE FROM TORT ACTIONS BROUGHT BY THE INJURED FELLOW EMPLOYEE
At the Trial Court level, the appellant argued strenuously
that Workman's Compensation benefits were not the exclusive remedy
under the Federal Employee's Compensation Act.

Even though that

argument has now been abandoned in the appellant's brief, cases
are herein cited for the benefit of the Court for the purpose of
showing the inter-relationship between the Federal Workman's
Compensation Act and the Federal Tort Claims Act which must be
read together in support of the proposition that not only are
employers immune from suit by employees where they are injured on
the employer's premises while coming to, leaving, or attending
work, but also that fellow employees are immune from tort

-6litigation.

The same result is achieved under the Federal Statutes

as is mandated by the Utah Workman1s Compensation Statute.
While it is true that as originally passed, the Federal
Employee?s Compensation Act only provided immunity from suit to
the employer, and not a fellow employee, the Federal Tort Claim^
Act, and specifically 28 U.S.C. §2679 was amended and became
effective on September 21, 1961, and by that amendment to the
Federal Tort Claims Act, the Federal Courts have ruled that fellow
employees thereafter enjoyed the same immunity from suit as did
employers where the injured fellow employee was entitled to
receive Workman's Compensation benefits.

Under the provisions of

the Federal Tort Claims Act, all causes of action involving a
federal employee must be brought against only the federal
government, and not against the employee.

Three Federal Appeals

Court cases are representative of the many cases standing for the
proposition that one federal employee injured when struck by a
motor vehicle being operated by another federal employee, as is
the case here, may not sue the fellow employee in either Federal
or State Court, but has, as his exclusive remedy, Workman's
Compensation benefits under the Federal Employee's Compensation
Act.

See Vantrease v. United States, 400 F.2d 853 (Sixth Circuit,

1968); Van Houten v. Ralls, 411 F.2d 940 (Ninth Circuit, 1969);
and Noga v. United States, 411 F.2d 943 (Ninth Circuit, 1969).
Vantrease the Court noted the Trial Court's ruling in Noga and

In

-7Van Houten and indicated it was the clear intent of Congress in
passing the amendments to the Tort Claims Act that co-employee
federal drivers were insulated from lawsuits by injured co-employees the same as the employer himself where Workman's Compensation
benefits were payable and paid to the injured employee.

In all

three of those cases, the Federal Appeals Court noted that with
the enactment of the 1961 amendment to the Federal Tort Claims
Act, co-employees were to be treated the same as the employer in
Workman's Compensation situations, and that an injured employee
could not sue the co-employee who had caused his injury under
circumstances where Workman's Compensation came into play.
Because the appellant has now apparently abandoned that
theory of the case advocated before the Trial Court, no. further
cases will be cited even though they are legion on the point.
POINT II
THE SAME "COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT" STANDARD SHOULD BE USED
IN DETERMINING BOTH ENTITLEMENT TO WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION
BENEFITS AS WELL AS APPLICABILITY OF THE EXCLUSIVE
REMEDY IMMUNITY OF CO-EMPLOYEES
It is the appellant's contention in this case that she is
entitled to receive Workman's Compensation on the one hand because
she was "within the course of employment" but that respondent, who
was doing the same thing she was doing was "not in the course of
employment."

While a very minority of the State Courts have

-8adopted such a criteria, namely, South Carolina in 1966 in two
cases, namely, Williams v, Bebbington, 146 SE 2d 853 (S.C.

1966)

and McNaughton v. Sims, 147 SE 2d 631 (S.C. 1966), the premise of
both those decisions is contrary to the already decided law of the
State of Utah.

The State of Utah in Soldier Creek Coal Company v.

Bailey, 709 P.2d 1165 (Utah 1985) specifically reaffirmed the
"Employer1s Premises" rule which had been announced anciently by
the Court in the Bountiful Brick case.

The Court specifically

held that while you were not within the course of your employment
while going to or coming from work, you are in the course and
scope of your employment, and the accident is covered by Workman1s
Compensation if it occurs on the employer!s premises, even if the
employee has not yet arrived at his work site or has already left
the work site.

A reading of the two South Carolina cases makes it

quite clear that South Carolina, unlike Utah, does not subscribe
to the "Premises Rule."

It appears that Texas, California, and

Nevada have also adopted the same rule as was adopted by South
Carolina, and allow an employee double recovery by permitting the
recovery of Workman1s Compensation benfits from the employer and
also allow a tort action against the fellow employee causing the
injury.
Several states, who have adopted the "Premises Rule" as has
Utah, have dealt with questions almost identical with that involved
in this case, namely, whether an employee, while on the premises

-9of the employer, while either coming to or going from work is
injured by the negligence of a fellow employee.

The Court of

Appeals of Illinois in Mast v. Rogers, 254 N.E. 2d 179 (111. 1969)
were called upon to decide whether one co-employee could sue
another co-employee for injuries and damages sustained after both
had left the parking lot of their employer, and were traveling on
a road owned by their employer.

In that case, the appellant con-

tended that her injury did not arise out of and in the course of
her employment so as to bar her tort action.

The appellant also

took the position that she should not have to accept Workman1s
Compensation benefits, but should be at liberty to sue her
co-employee because they were no longer in the course of their
employment after leaving work and nearly reaching the public
highway to which the company road led.

In sustaining the Trial

Court's finding that the injury occurred in the course of employment, the Illinois Court noted as follows:
"Proof that an employee is present at the place where he
was injured because of his employment is not by itself
sufficient to sustain his burden of proving that an
injury arose out of the employment, but an injury fairly
traceable to the employment as a contributory proximate
cause qualifies as having arisen out of the employment.
(Citing cases)
"This Court is of the opinion that the injury occurred
on a road that was provided and used as an incident of
the employment, the P.E.T. plant-owned road being an
adjunct of the P.E.T. plant, and that the injury is
fairly traceable to the employment as a contributing,
proximate cause; therefore, the injury arose out of the
employment.

-10!f

The words ! in the course of the employment1 concern the
time, place, and circumstances of the injury, (citing
case). The employment contemplates an employee!s entry
upon and departure from the employer!s premises as much
as it contemplates his working there. Employment is not
limited to the exact moments when an employee begins or
ceases his duties, but necessarily includes a reasonable
time before commencing and after concluding actual
employment, (citing case). Such is the situation as it
existed in this case.
"We conclude that the plaintiff-employee was still in
the course of her employment at the time of the accidental injury."
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia in Eisnaugle
v. Booth, 226 S.E. 2d 259 (W.Va. 1976) dealt with a case whose fact
situation was nearly identical with this case.

In that case, the

appellant and the respondent were both employees of the National
Steele Corporation.

They were both on their way to work, and had

entered the parking lot of their employer.

Appellant had parked

his car in the employer1s private parking lot, which was adjacent
to his place of employment and was walking to a location where he
would punch a time card to begin work.

While driving his personal

automobile to park in the same parking area, respondent struck
appellant and caused the injuries which were the subject matter of
the lawsuit.
After setting out the West Virginia Statute, which has the
same provisions as both the Federal Statute and the Utah Statute
relative to employers1 and co-employees1 immunity from civil liability, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held as follows:

-11As a general rule, where an injury is received by an
employee on the employer's property near his place of
work while the employee is going to work, such injury is
deemed to have arisen in the course and as a result of
his employment. (Citing cases and authorities). This
familiar exception to the "Going and Coming" Rule is
articulated in the syllabus announced in Hager v.
Compensation Commissioner, 112 W. Va. 492, 165 SE 668
(1932) :
11

'Where an employee is accidentally injured upon premises
owned or controlled by the employer at a point reasonably
proximate to the place of work, while the employee is
going to or from his work on a premises route in general
use by the employees, such injury will be deemed to have
arisen from and in the course of the employment, within
the Workman's Compensation Act.'
"The Virginia case of Brown v. Reed, 209 Va. 562, 165 SE
2d 394 (1969) is almost identical to the case at bar. In
that case, an employee had parked his automobile in the
employer's parking lot and, after changing clothes in the
locker room near the parking lot, was struck by an automobile of a fellow employee while walking across the
parking lot to his employment. It was held that the
injury was received in the course of and as a result of
his employment, and that the plaintiff's rights and
remedies were governed exclusively by the provisions of
the Workman's Compensation Act. Similarly, in the vast
majority of jurisidictions, the general rule, even in the
absence of an immunizing statute, is that where an
employee who is going to or coming from work is injured
by a fellow employee on the employer's parking lot, the
injury is received within the course of and as a result
of employment and defendant co-employee is immune from
liability for such injury. See, Jackson v. Hutchinson,
453 SW 2d 269 (Ky. 1970); Threet v. Pinkston, 20 MichT
App. 39, 173 NW.2d 731 (1970)."
The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, of New York, in
Bagley v. Gilbert, 428 N.Y.S. 2d 737 (New York 1980) dealt with a
similar question where an employee, who had punched off the clock
and was leaving the employer's premises for his personal errands
was sued by another employee still working on the premises.

In

-12that case, the injured party argued that the defendant was not "in
the same employ11 because he had punched out and was beginning to
leave the premises for lunch, which took him out of the course of
employment.

The injured party further argued that because of a

violation of a company policy concerning the use of a private
automobile in a certain part of the employer's premises, there
were further grounds for making the employee leaving the premises
subject to personal liability.

The Court ruled that the injured

party's only right of recovery was for Workman's Compensation, and
that even though the defendant had punched out and was leaving
work and was using his car in an area of the employer's premises
that he should not have been using the car made no difference.
They held that Workman's Compensation was the exclusive remedy to
the injured party, and precluded him from maintaining the negligence action.
Professor Larsen, who was cited as the authority in the
Solider Creek Coal case for the "Premises Rule" has suggested in
the same treatise, namely, Larsen, The Law of Workman's
Compensation, at Section 72.22 the solution to the pertinent
issue of this appeal.

In that part of his treatise, he is dealing

with the immunity of employers and co-employees under Workman's
Compensation, and is specifically dealing with the question of
whether the co-employee is acting in the course of his employment.
He first asks two questions, namely:

-13"The commonest question that arises in these cases is:
Which test of 'course of employment1 applies? Is it the
Workman's Compensation test, or the vicarious liability
test?"
He then discusses the cases relied upon by the appellant in
support of the proposition that you should apply two different
tests, so as to entitle an injured party to a double recovery,
namely, Workman's Compensation from the employer, and tort liability from the co-employee, and then concludes with the observation
that:
"The more satisfactory test, unless expressly ruled out
by statute, is that adopted by New Jersey and the majority of states that have confronted the issue, which
simply uses the regular Workman's Compensation course of
employment standard for this purpose. After all, there
are complications enough administering one course of
employment test under the act, without adding a second.
By adopting the compensation test, a Court has at hand a
ready made body of cases with which to dispose of most
boarder line situations."
Professor Larsen cites the New Jersey case of Konitch v.
Hartung, 81 N.J. super. 376, 195 A.2d 649 (1963), and also
Eisnaugle v. Booth, 226 S.E. 2d 259 (W. Va. 1976).
In Konitch, the New Jersey Court was dealing with a fact
situation almost identical to the fact situation in this case.
There, the plaintiff drove her car into her employer's parking
lot, and after parking it, started to walk toward the exit from
the parking lot in order to get to the office where she worked.
While she was still inside the parking lot, she was struck and
injured by an automobile operated by defendant, who was driving to
work and was about to park his car.

It was then the defendant's

-14intention to walk to his work station as the plaintiff was doing
at the time of the accident.

After citing the applicable New

Jersey Workman1s Compensation Statute relative to the Workman1s
Compensation being the exclusive remedy as against the employer
and the fellow employee, which is almost identical to both the
Utah and the Federal Exclusivity Provision, the Court framed the
issue before them as follows:
"We have here a case where the injured plaintiff and
defendant are employed by the same employer. Both were
at the parking lot for the purpose of beginning their
work day. Although defendant has the use of the company's motor vehicle for pleasure as well as business,
at the time of the accident, his sole reason for operating the vehicle was to get to work."
In that case, the plaintiff argued that not only must
the parties be employed by the same employer, but that the
co-employee must commit the tort while performing a duty and
function of his employment.

In rejecting that argument, the

Court cited Professor Larsen's treatise on Workman's
Compensation Law, holding basically that:
"*** The test, therefore, is not that the co-employee
should have been acting under an employment duty, but
rather in the course of his employment.
"There can be no question that when defendant drove to
work and entered the parking lot provided by the company,
he was in the course of employment. An accident arises
1
in the course of employment' when it occurs within the
period of employment and at a place where the employee
may reasonably be. (Citing Larsen) Our Courts have
held that the employer's parking lot is part of the
employment premises, and an employee entering or using
the lot in the circumstances here present is in the
course of employment. (Citing cases)'*

-15Th e Supreme Court of Kansas, in facing a similar question,
reached the same result, but under a little different mechanism.
They have adopted, as a criteria for the "Exclusive Remedy'1 test a
criteria where you look at both co-employees, and if the allegedly
negligent co-employee would be entitled to receive Workman1s
Compensation if he were injured in the same accident, and the
injured co-employee is also entitled to receive compensation in the
same accident, then the exclusive remedy provision of the Workman1s
Compensation Act gives immunity from suit to the negligent
co-employee.
In Blank v. Chawla, 678 P.2d 162 (Kan. 1984) the plaintiff
filed an action against the defendant after he was struck by an
automobile operated by defendant, a fellow employee, as he was
walking in the employer's parking lot.

Both employees had finished

their work at the time of the accident, and were walking and driving respectively through the parking lot.

It was plaintiff1s con-

tention that because defendant was no longer doing the work of his
employer, but was leaving the employer's parking lot after his
work day, that he was not in the course of his employment, and was
not, therefore, a co-employee.

The Kansas Court adopted the same

"Premises Rule" as has Utah and'most other states, and allows the
payment of Workman's Compensation benefits to any employee injured
while on the premises of the employer, even though the injury
occurs either before they have officially commenced work after

-16punching a time clock, or after leaving work and punching out.

In

ruling that Workman's Compensation was the plaintiff's exclusive
remedy, because both the plaintiff and the defendant would have
been entitled to Workman's Compensation had they both been injured
in the same accident, the Court stated:
"Here, had Chawla been injured in the same accident,
under the same circumstances, he would have been
entitled to recover under the Workman's Compensation
Act. In an action for damages by an injured party
against his co-employee in which the Exclusive Remedy
Provision of the Workman's Compensation Act is asserted
as a defense, it is held: (1) A co-employee is immune
only if he or she would have been entitled to receive
Workman's Compensation had she or he been injured in the
same accident; and (2) Since no genuine issue of material fact remains to be resolved, the Trial Court did not
err in granting summary judgment."

It really does not matter which of the various state tests
you apply, considering the difference of approach between the
Courts of Kansas, New Jersey, West Virginia, New York, Michigan,
Kentucky, or Virginia, you come to the same result in this case,
because under any of those varying tests, in light of Utah's
"Premises Rule" the appellant and the respondent were co-employees
at the time of the accident, and were functioning on their employer's property incident to their employment with their common
employer.
The appellant's justification for receiving double compensation for the injury is flawed.

The law has recognized repeatedly

the role of the no-fault concept of compensation in both the work

-17place, the less serious automobile accident injury cases, and
overtures are being made in other areas, such as products liability and medical malpractice.

The argument made by appellant that

Workman's Compensation is an inadequate remedy for injured individuals because it fails to provide damages for either pain and
suffering or loss of earning capacity is not only a misstatement,
but is immaterial.

You get what you get under Workman's

Compensation, No-Fault, and the like as is mandated by statute.
The appellant is no worse off and no better off in the receipt of
Workman's Compensation benefits by the fact she was injured in the
parking lot as she neared her work station than she would have
been had the time clock fallen on her and caused the same injury
immediately after she punched in.

Also, she is compensated for

her loss of earning capacity assuming she has suffered a loss of
earning capacity.

Not only does she receive payment of her medi-

cal costs, and loss of income actually incurred, if she has sustained a permanent partial disability of some type, she is also
entitled to compensation for that, which is in fact compensation
for loss of earning capacity.
CONCLUSIONS
Appellant was injured by a co-employee while on the secured
premises of their employer incident to the employment of both the
appellant and the respondent.

Under both Federal Workman's

Compensation Law and State Workman's Compensation Law, her exclusive remedy against not only her employer, but also her fellow

-18employee, is Workman's Compensation benefits.

To hold otherwise

would be to totally disregard the "Premises Rule11 which was
reaffirmed as the law of this jurisdiction as recently as 1985,
and would result in a double recovery to the appellant, allowing
her to receive Workman's Compensation benefits under one standard
of course and scope of employment, but to be able to sue her
co-employee under another standard of course and scope of
employment.
The Trial Court's judgment entered on stipulated facts
should be affirmed.
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